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Petroplus: Deeds of Trust--Suit by Trustee to Cancel the Trust Deed
WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
DEEDS OF TRUST -

SUIT BY TRUSTEE TO CANCEL THE TRUST

DEFi.-The plaintiff, trustee under a deed of trust, sought to have
it canceled on the ground that the debt secured thereby had been
discharged by an assignee of the original beneficiary. Plaintiff
also asked that the land covered by the trust deed be subjected to
sale to satisfy the creditors of the trust debtor, and that a prior
judgment acquired by the plaintiff be given preference. Plaintiff took a decree pro confesso. On application of the beneficiary
the court vacated the decree insofar as it affected his rights.
Plaintiff appealed, but the court affirmed the order below in
Taylor v. Thomase on the theory that after accepting a trust, it
was the duty of the trustee to execute it, unless released by the
beneficiary or a court of equity, and that a trustee could not act
in the interest of himself or others to the detriment of his beneficiary. Two judges dissented on the ground that the bill did not
attack the trust, but merely alleged that the trust had been fully
discharged.
This seems to be the first case of its kind in West Virginia.
That the act of a trustee cannot defeat the trust is well settled2
A trustee cannot set up a claim to the trust property adverse to
the cestui que trust, or deny his title.3 A trustee has no right to
obtain the property for himself by any device whatsoever.' Proceedings for the compulsory release of the trust must be brought
by the trust debtor,' and the trustee is an impartial party who must
look after the interest of all parties concerned.' The West Virginia Court has not hesitated to apply the general principles of
trusts to situations involving a trust deed. But the case in question does not involve a breach of a fiduciary relation. An ordinary
deed of trust creates a very limited type of trust. The trustee is
empowered to sell the land on the default of the cestui when requested to do so by the beneficiary. Beyond that he owes no
active duty. If in his belief the debt has been discharged, why
should he not be permitted to bring a bill to have the deed canceled
by the court? Applying for an adjudication of the rights of the
1155 S. E. 546 (1930).
2PERRY ON TRUSTS (7th ed. Baldes 1929), § 104. See Marshall v. Porter,
71 W. Va. 330, 76 S. E. 653 (1912).
aMorris v. Morris, 48 W. Va. 430, 37 S. E. 570 (1900); Erwin v. Harris,
41 X. 0. 215 (1849).
' Sunnybrook Zinc Co. v. Metzler, 231 F. 304, 238 F. 1007 (aff'd), 151 C. 0.

A. 659 (1916).
5Marshall v. Porter, supra n. 2.
0Lively v. Winton, 30 W. Va. 554, 4 S. E. 451 (1887).
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parties can hardly be an attack upon the trust, or a breach of the
very limited fiduciary relation.
In Miller v. Mitchell the court defined the powers of a trustee
as limited by the instrument creating the trust. He has no power
to receive payment of the debt, and discharge the debtor, where
the deed has not expressly conferred such power. In the ordinary
trust deed, where property is conveyed merely as security for a
debt, no such power is conferred. True though it is that a trustee
cannot by his sole act discharge himself from his duties,' yet it is
difficult to understand why he should be denied the privilege of
going into a court of competent jurisdiction to have the trust declared discharged.
It would seem that West Virginia has misapplied the doctrine
that a trustee cannot derive a benefit from his position at the expense of his cestu que trust, by extending it to a situation where
a trustee seeks an adjudication of the rights of the parties where
he has a substantive interest.
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The plaintiff, in 1929, commenced an action against the defendant, claiming
damages for personal injuries caused by his negligent driving of
a motor car in 1928, in which car the plaintiff was a passenger.
Three months after the suit was started they were married. Defendant was allowed to amend his defense by adding "Parties
have, since the issuance of the writ, inter-married and are now
husband and wife." It was admitted that the real defendant in
the action was the insurance company with which the defendant
was insured. Held: that her right of action was not such P,
"thing in action" as would become her separate property withiii
the meaning of the Married Women's Property Act, but was barred by the general disability of the husband and wife to sue each
other for a tort. Gottliffe v. Edelston.1
This English case in denying relief for personal injuries
against a spouse follows the recognized weight of authority in
the United States.! Decided as it is, at a time when many claim
AGAINST WIFE -

EFFECT OF SUBSEQUENT MARRIAGE. -

7 58 W. Va. 431, 52 S. E. 487 (1905).
See also Fidelity Insurance Co. v.
Shenandoah Railway Co., 32 W. Va. 244, 9 S. E. 180 (1889).
8
PERRY ON TRUSTS (7th ed. Baldes 1929), § 274.
12 K. B. & P. 378 (November 5, 1930).
2Heyman v. Heyman, 19 Ga. App. 634, 92 S. E. 25, (1917); Rogers v.
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